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Abstract 
In this paper I contrast ‘economic’ and ‘organizational’ approaches to corporate 
governance, in order to draw out some of their distinctive features and discuss 
their relative strengths and weaknesses. I identify some promising areas of new 
research which examine the role of social controls and trust for the way that 
companies are governed. Although these are fairly embryonic, I argue that they 
call into question the hegemony of economic theories in theorizing the 
governance of the corporation. I conclude by advocating a re-consideration and 
broadening of the current conceptual scope of corporate governance, so as to 
facilitate and encourage other potentially valuable ways of exploring and 
understanding how companies are governed. 
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Introduction 
Anglo-American economic theories of the firm have come to 
dominate scholarly and institutional approaches to corporate 
governance across the world, in spite of criticisms of many of their 
underlying assumptions and propositions. For example, they tend to 
see the firm principally in contractual terms, are guided by the 
assumption of utility-maximizing self-interested human behaviour, 
and tend to posit the protection of investors’ capital as the ‘corporate 
governance problem’. Whilst these might be justifiable at the level of 
market analysis, they are more difficult to defend for corporate 
governance research where the object of attention is the firm itself. 
Some ‘organizational approaches’ (for want of a better term) to 
corporate governance have been proposed as a counter to economic 
theories, which by contrast tend to begin with a more complex 
concept of the firm, allow for other-oriented behaviour, and can 
conceive the governance of companies as routinely involving multiple 
relationships. However, these tend to be either poorly developed 
theoretically, or are relatively embryonic. In what follows I want to 
contrast these ‘economic’ and ‘organizational’ approaches to 
corporate governance in more detail, drawing out some of their 
distinctive features and discussing their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. I do not want to impugn the value of economic theories, 
but do question their pre-eminence in the field of corporate 
governance research. In particular, I argue that some recent research 
in the organizational literature which examines the role of social 
controls and trust for the way that companies are governed, suggests 
that the current conceptual scope of corporate governance could 
usefully be re-considered and broadened. 
 
‘Economic Approaches’ to Corporate Governance  
Berle and Means (1932) are often credited as the forefathers of 
contemporary thinking about corporate governance. They argued that 
in the earliest days of American industrialization, companies, which 
were organized to deal with major projects such as the construction of 
railways and canals, tended to be private institutions, and were 
administered by their founders on the basis that they were their own 
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private property. The growth of professional managers at the top of 
increasingly large organizations, along with the dispersion of 
shareholding away from exclusive founding family interests together 
came to effect a growing separation of ownership and effective 
control: 
 
The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where 
the interests of owner and ultimate manager may, and often do, 
diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to 
limit the use of power disappear. (Berle and Means 1932: 6-7) 
 
Their ideas are often seen in turn as a development of the much earlier 
views of Adam Smith: 
 
The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own.  Like the stewards of a rich man, 
they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their 
master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from 
having it.  Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, 
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
(Smith 1776: Book 5, Chapter 1) 
 
The legitimate exercise of power within this owner/control dichotomy 
became a central element of managerialism, which dominated 
research on the firm until the 1970s (Chandler 1962; Bratton 1989). 
The direct influence of these ideas is still felt today, especially 
amongst practitioners and policymakers who typically discuss 
shareholders as company owners, and corporate governance as an 
issue primarily concerning the separation of ownership and control. 
In the 1970s, however, new economic theories of the firm emerged to 
challenge the pre-eminence of managerialism. Arguably the most 
influential of these for the contemporary understanding of corporate 
governance is ‘agency theory’. This emerged from the publication of 
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Alchian & Demsetz’s (1972) seminal paper Production, Information 
Costs and Economic Organisation and  Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) 
paper Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure, which introduced the idea of the firm as a nexus 
of contracts amongst individual factors of production. Previously, 
classical economics had conceived the firm as a single-product entity 
with a commitment to the maximization of profits, and what went on 
within the firm was considered to be of subordinate interest to what 
went on in markets. It was argued that with this new theory, 
economics was for the first time able to analyze the firm itself; the 
neo-classical view was able to incorporate the workings of the firm 
into economic theory by explaining it as a constantly re-negotiated 
contract, contrived by an aggregation of individuals each with the aim 
of maximizing their own utility.  
 
In this theory, the ‘corporate governance problem’ is not concerned 
with the separation of ownership and control. Shareholders are 
afforded a pre-eminent position in the firm, but this is legitimized not 
by the idea that they are the firm’s owners, but instead are its ‘residual 
risk takers’ (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). The argument in its basic 
form is that when production is undertaken by a team, which can be 
more efficient than individual production, it is difficult to determine 
exactly who is responsible for what part of the joint effort. As such, 
individuals have an opportunity to ‘shirk’. In order to prevent 
shirking, a ‘monitor’ is required: the monitor is able to make contracts 
with all the other parties and pay them according to their opportunity 
cost, and in return for monitoring the team is entitled to claim the 
residual value created, which incentivizes the monitor not to shirk 
herself. In the public company, it is generally assumed that it is the 
shareholders who have the most at risk, with all other parties 
benefiting from (reasonably) complete contracts. As a consequence it 
is the shareholders who have most to lose if the company fails, and 
most to gain from effective monitoring of the other company 




... ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the 
firm. Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just the 
set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs 
and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. In this 
‘nexus of contracts’ perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant 
concept. (p.290) 
 
Given the assumption of self-interested utility-maximizing motivation 
of individual actors, it is assumed that the relationship between 
shareholders (‘principals’) and managers (‘agents’) is problematic: 
how is the ‘principal’ able to prevent the ‘agent’ from maximizing his 
own utility (Jensen 1994)? For agency theorists efficient markets are 
the solution; consequently the main focus of their approach to 
corporate governance is the elaboration and facilitation of market 
mechanisms that can mitigate this agency problem. These include an 
efficient market for corporate control, for management labour, for 
corporate information and so on, all of which will ensure management 
bears the costs of its own misconduct and will therefore create the 
incentives for self-control. 
 
Further to this neo-classical conceptualization, the idea of firm as 
contract has at the same time been developed in a different form by 
new institutional economists. Whereas neo-classical economics sees 
the market as the only way to organize efficient contracting, and the 
firm is seen simply as an artefact of constantly re-negotiated 
contracts, new institutional economics conceives the firm to be a 
discrete, relatively permanent hierarchy which exists as an alternative 
to contracting in markets. Like neo-classical economics, new 
institutional economics is concerned with ensuring the efficiency of 
private contracting, but rather than concentrating on the maximization 
of profit, the focus of study is generally perceived to be the 
minimization of transaction costs. This notion was originally put 
forward by Coase (1937), but has been developed in particular by 
Williamson (1979, 1985). 
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In so far as corporate governance is concerned, new institutional 
economics differs from agency theory in that the governance 
problems of firms are perceived to proceed from a number of 
contractual hazards, including self-interested opportunism, 
informational asymmetries, asset specificity and small numbers 
bargaining, and the problem of bounded rationality (Williamson 1984, 
1985). The approach is concerned with discovering internal measures 
and mechanisms which reduce the costs associated with these 
contractual hazards to an efficient level: the external discipline of the 
market cannot be relied on to mitigate these problems, as it has 
‘limited constitutional powers to conduct audits and has limited 
access to the firm’s incentive and resource allocation machinery’ 
(Williamson 1975: 143). Like neo-classical economics though, the 
locus of attention remains the shareholder - manager relationship, 
although in this case it is because shareholders are perceived to ‘face a 
diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because the assets in 
question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a 
well-focused, transaction-specific way’ (Williamson 1984: 1210). 
 
Notwithstanding their inherently distinctive conceptualizations of the 
‘governance problem’, the different theories discussed thus far have 
helped to reify the firm as an economic mechanism, and 
institutionalize the idea that corporate governance is primarily 
concerned with the control of managers by shareholders. The pre-
eminence of such a view has been re-inforced by the recent 
spectacular increase in the concentration of shareholdings in the hands 
of large institutional investors. Over the past three decades, holdings 
of shares by insurance companies and pension funds have grown 
considerably at the expense of holdings by individuals in many 
developed economies. For example, institutional investors accounted 
for 47.1% by value of UK ordinary shares at the end of 2000, while 
individuals held just 16% of the total. In 1969 the figures were almost 
the reverse, with institutions accounting for 21.2% of shares and 
individuals for 47.4% (Hill and Duffield 2001). It is widely argued 
that this new concentration of shareholdings means that institutional 
investors are consequently in a good position to actualize their 
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theoretical corporate governance role as company ‘principals’ or 
‘owners’ (depending on the particular theory subscribed to). 
Formerly, individual shareholders were too numerous and too widely 
dispersed to exert adequate corporate control, but increasingly 
powerful institutional investors now have both the ability and the 
incentive to monitor and discipline company managers (Black 1992; 
Maug 1998).  
 
In sum, ‘corporate governance’ is now widely conceived to centre on 
a single problem, namely how the owners of capital are able to protect 
their investments:  
 
... corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return 
some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do 
not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do 
suppliers of finance control managers? (Shleifer and Vishny 1997: 
737) 
 
Not only does this view pre-dominate amongst researchers, but also 
practitioners (Monks 2001) and policymakers (OECD 1998,  G7 
1999). For example the World Bank, which along with many other 
international bodies is actively promoting global standards of 
corporate governance, claims in a recent report: 
 
What makes corporate governance necessary? Put simply, the 
interests of those who have effective control over a firm can differ 
from the interests of those who supply the firm with external finance. 
The problem, commonly referred to as the principal-agent problem, 
grows out of the separation of ownership and control and of insiders 
and outsiders. In the absence of the protections that good governance 
supplies, asymmetries of information and difficulties of monitoring 
mean that capital providers who lack control over the corporation will 
find it risky and costly to protect themselves from the opportunistic 
behavior of managers or controlling shareholders. (World Bank 1999) 
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Critiques of Economic Approaches 
The ideas of economists have undoubtedly provided numerous 
insights into the workings of the firm, and have enriched our 
understanding of some of the dynamics of organizational behaviour; 
for example they remind us that there is lots of self-interested 
behaviour in organizational life (Perrow 1986), and they have helped 
researchers think about risk, outcome uncertainty, incentives and 
information systems (Eisenhardt 1989). However their pre-eminence 
also means that alternative views about corporate governance are 
arguably not given the consideration they warrant, and critiques of the 
descriptive and normative validity of economic theories, which call 
into question their relevance for the understanding of corporate 
governance, are glossed over. 
 
For example, the simplifying assumptions that most economic 
theories of the firm make have been widely criticized, especially by 
organizational researchers whose work shows that organizations are 
characterized by imperfect information, inefficiencies, multiplex 
incentives and contextual influences (Perrow 1986). Eisenhardt, a 
staunch defender of agency theory, concedes that: 
 
Agency theory presents a partial view of the world that, although it is 
valid, also ignores a good bit of the complexity of organizations. 
Additional perspectives can help capture the greater complexity. 
(1989: 71). 
 
As for transaction costs economics, the limitations of its original 
simple dichotomization of markets and hierarchies has long been 
acknowledged. For example ‘intermediate’ modes of governance have 
been put forward (Williamson 1991), and the theory has been refined 
by Hart and Moore (1990) who develop their view of the firm as a 
collection of jointly-owned physical assets, and more recently by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) who propose the firm as a nexus of 
specific investments which cannot be replicated by the market. There 
has also been a slow but gradual acceptance amongst transaction costs 
economics that socially embedded personal relationships play an 
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important role in economic exchange (Zaheer and Venkatraman 
1995). 
 
Some, however, suggest that the refinement of contractual theories of 
the firm is inadequate, as many of their fundamental assumptions are 
so inaccurate that they discredit the entire approach. For example 
Moran & Ghoshal (1996) strongly criticize Williamson’s (1975, 
1985) pessimistic assumptions about organizations as well as human 
behaviour and motivation: 
 
[Economic] theories of today are dominated by a profoundly 
pessimistic view of organizations, concerned far more about the 
unintended consequences of organizing than about organizing for 
their intended purpose, and by an even more skeptical view of 
individual-organization interactions, grounded in the assumption that 
the human role in organizations is largely passive and frequently 
pathological... the all-pervasive concern for shirking, opportunism, 
and inertia in organizational economics (Moran and Ghoshal 1996: 
70). 
 
Moreover the normative implications of economic theories are 
perceived to be especially dangerous: Ghoshal and Moran (1996) 
criticize the fact that these theories create the conditions which 
encourage the type of behaviour they assume: 
 
Social sciences carry a special responsibility because of the process of 
the double hermeneutic: its theories affect the agents who are its 
subject matter. By assuming the worst, this theory can bring out the 
worst in economic behavior. By assuming opportunism and 
establishing it as his base case, Williamson is blind to forces that 
work to confirm or discredit the validity of his assumptions ... In the 
process, his theory is likely to encourage the very behavior that it 
takes for granted and seeks so hard to control. (p.39) 
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In terms of their specific relevance for analyses of corporate 
governance, a number of other criticisms have been levelled against 
mainstream economic approaches. For example, O’Sullivan (2000) 
makes an important point in criticizing their failure to incorporate a 
systematic analysis of innovation or production in their conceptual 
frameworks. Failing to include the production side is critical for 
corporate governance as it risks promoting different claims (especially 
the claims of shareholders) on corporate revenues ‘whether or not 
their contributions to the generation of these revenues make those 
returns possible on a sustainable basis’ (O’Sullivan 2000: 42). At a 
more general level, several researchers have noted that economic 
theories of the firm are ethnocentric in their conceptualization and 
development, and that the bulk of empirical evidence used to support 
them have been drawn principally from Anglo-Saxon sources, in 
particular the United States and United Kingdom (Boyd, Carroll et al. 
1996), which limits their usefulness when exploring corporate 
governance in an international context. Furthermore, the majority of 
empirical support appears to be based on inferences from secondary 
source analysis or statistical data (Hill 1995; Boyd, Carroll et al. 
1996), rather than empirical fieldwork close to the phenomenon which 
is the subject of enquiry. 
 
‘Organizational Approaches’ to Corporate Governance 
Given the various critiques of mainstream economic approaches to 
corporate governance discussed above, in this section I want to ask 
what other conceptual frameworks have been put forward as 
alternatives, and explore their relative strengths and weaknesses. The 
‘stakeholder approach’ to the firm is one idea that has been proposed 
as a counter to economic theories for thinking about the governance 
of corporations. Although the intellectual lineage of stakeholder ideas 
can be traced back to the work of Clark (1916) and Dodd (1932), the 
development of a stakeholder approach to the firm is usually 
attributed to Freeman (Freeman 1984) who argued that economic 
theories were based on outdated images of the firm, so a new way of 
thinking about business organization was required: 
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...the emergence of numerous stakeholder groups and new strategic 
issues require a rethinking of our traditional picture of the firm ... We 
must redraw the picture in a way that accounts for the changes. 
(Freeman, 1984: 24) 
 
At its core, this approach is concerned with challenging the amorality 
/ immorality of mainstream economic conceptualizations of the firm, 
and refuting Friedman’s (1970) famous proclamation that “the only 
business of business is business”. However in spite of some 17 years 
having passed since the publication of Freeman’s ‘call to arms’, the 
development of a rigorous and useful ‘stakeholder theory’ of the firm 
still seems a long way off, with many proposals put forward tending 
to rely on ‘a serious mismatch of variables which are mixed and 
correlated almost indiscriminately with a set of stakeholder-related 
performance variables that are not theoretically linked’ (Wood and 
Jones 1995: 231). 
 
One possible reason for this is that most work in this field appears to 
be preoccupied with justifying a stakeholder approach to the firm, 
rather than the construction of systematic theory to describe more 
adequately contemporary organizational practices. In many cases this 
seems to lead scholars along the path of trying to adapt economic 
theories, rather than constructing afresh an alternative conceptual 
framework for the firm. For example Jones (1995), explicitly 
recognizing that the principle shortcoming of the stakeholder 
approach is its lack of testable theory, proposes an instrumental theory 
of stakeholder management. His starting point is a critique of the 
economic literature’s exclusive focus on devices (such as incentives, 
monitoring mechanisms and governing structures) to align the 
interests of principals and agents. He argues that the promotion of 
stakeholder thinking in contractual situations is a far more effective 
way to reduce transaction costs. He draws on the example of Japan, 
where he suggests that the voluntary adoption of standards of 
behaviour limit or eliminate the potential for opportunistic behaviour. 
This is, he argues, a more efficient way of contracting: moral 
sentiments may solve the problems of opportunism in markets and 
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hierarchies better than the incentives of economic theory. Although 
Jones offers some useful insights into the behavioural assumptions of 
economic theories of the firm as well as characteristics of the market, 
ultimately his argument is simply a variation of (transaction cost) 
economic theory, based on the premise that ethics in business 
transactions are economically efficient. Blair (Blair 1995, 1996; Blair 
and Kochan 2000) puts forward a slightly different model of 
stakeholder activity, criticizing the current stream of research on 
corporate governance as ‘a long and somewhat arcane scholarly effort 
to explain large enterprises in a way consistent with neo-classical 
economic theory’ (1995: 228). Her main objection is similar to that of 
Freeman (1984), that the particular model of the joint-stock company 
proposed by mainstream economic approaches is outdated, and that 
modern, knowledge-based corporations require firm-specific 
investments in human capital for their survival. In this respect, Blair 
argues for a more important governance role for employees as they 
too have a residual risk in the firm. Yet beyond this, like Jones her re-
formulation of the corporate governance problem then makes many of 
the same assumptions that mainstream economics does, including the 
primacy of the market as an arena for the selection of optimal 
economic choices by utilty-maximising individual agents (1995: 322).  
 
A related but distinct theoretical development, which was also 
initially established as a direct challenge to agency theory, is 
stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis 1991; Davis and Donaldson 
1997). Stewardship theory proposes that a manager is the steward of a 
company’s assets, not an agent of the shareholders, and that the 
‘separation of ownership and control’ is not a problem to be 
overcome, but was a positive and inevitable development enabling the 
effective management of complex organizations. The theory suggests 
that depth of knowledge, commitment, access to current operating 
information and technical expertise are important requirements 
enabling a company to be run effectively. Consequently it is argued 
that the economic performance of a firm increases when power and 
authority are concentrated in a single executive (i.e. a dual CEO / 
Chairman), who is not distracted by external non-executive directors. 
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In this respect stewardship theory directly opposes agency theory, 
where the monitoring role of an independent board and a powerful 
Chairman, who can represent the interests of shareholders against the 
self-interest of executive managers, is conceived always to have 
positive effect on performance. There has been some limited 
empirical support for the claims of stewardship theory. For example 
Muth & Donaldson (1998) carried out an empirical study examining 
the boards of 145 of the largest companies on the Australian Stock 
Exchange. The findings were that the more independent the board, 
and with the split of CEO - Chairman, the lower the returns to 
shareholders and the lower the levels of sales growth. As such 
stewardship theory provides an interesting challenge to analyses of 
corporate governance grounded in agency theory, but its full theoretic 
contribution is yet to be developed (Davis and Donaldson 1997).  
 
The idea of trusteeship (Kay and Silberston 1995) is in some respects 
not dissimilar to stewardship theory, but has expressly been put 
forward as a way of advancing the understanding of the way 
companies are governed without falling prey to some of the 
simplifying assumptions of mainstream economics. Trusteeship is 
borrowed from the concept in English law which governs the 
behaviour of someone who controls and manages assets which they 
do not beneficially own themselves. The notion of a board of directors 
as the trustee of company assets, like the idea of stewardship, is 
argued by its supporters to capture the roles and responsibilities of the 
board more accurately than the economic theories discussed earlier. 
However trusteeship emphasizes, perhaps more than stewardship, that 
managers have a wide-range of motivations other than simply 
maximizing their own benefits: when faced with a situation which 
brings no direct personal advantage a manager may still base his/her 
action on a sense of duty and identification with the organization 
(Etzioni 1975). Kay and Silberston discuss some of the implications 
of the theory as follows: 
 
... the duty of the trustee is to preserve and enhance the value of the 
assets under his control, and to balance fairly the various claims to the 
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returns which these assets generate. The trusteeship model therefore 
differs from the agency model in two fundamental ways. The 
responsibility of the trustees is to sustain the corporation’s assets. This 
differs from the value of the corporation’s shares. The difference 
comes not only because the stock market may value these assets 
incorrectly. It also arises because these assets of the corporation, for 
these purposes include the skills of the employees, the expectations of 
customers and suppliers, and the company’s reputation in the 
community. (Kay and Silberston 1995: 92) 
 
For trusteeship, the non-executive director is a valuable creative force 
on the board of directors, not the representative of the shareholder 
interest as put forward by agency theory, nor the interloper described 
by stewardship theory.  
 
One feature that seems particularly noteworthy in relation to the 
economic approaches to corporate governance discussed so far is that 
trusteeship does not necessarily require accountability to a specific 
other. The departure point of Kay and Silberston’s version of 
trusteeship is that in spite of some theoretical claims to the contrary, 
company assets are not legally, or in any practical sense, ‘owned’ by 
anyone. As such, it is difficult to state clearly to whom managers are 
accountable; it is this difficulty that Kay and Silberston suggest 
creates many of the controversies around the issue of corporate 
governance. They argue that the idea of trusteeship circumvents such 
problems, by suggesting that in a company, managers control broadly 
defined company assets in trust (the legal concept which gives 
notional control of assets to a party, but with a legal obligation to 
administer the assets in a certain way). Kay and Silberston see this 
conceptualization as being closer to the social reality of organizations 
than the neoclassical economist’s notion that the company is 
essentially an artificially constructed bundle of contracts. 
Nonetheless, the idea of trusteeship is argued still to require a system 
of monitoring and surveillance, to ensure that company assets are 
administered in the best interests of the company. Kay and Silberston 
 13 
suggest that these principally should take the form of legal 
mechanisms, rather than accountability to a specified other.  
 
This last point raises the issue that, to some extent or another, almost 
all current approaches to corporate governance (‘economic’ and 
‘organizational’) ultimately focus on hierarchical controls such as fiat, 
incentives or monitoring mechanisms (Williamson 1996) which are 
aimed at attenuating the potentially opportunistic or utility-
maximizing behaviour of company managers. Recently though, some 
organizational researchers have put forward ideas that as social 
organizations, the governance of firms might also usefully be 
explored in terms of non-hierarchical or social controls, which 
includes, for example, trust (Tyler and Kramer 1996; Lane and 
Bachman  2001) and the responsibilities and obligations that are 
engendered in everyday socio-economic interactions (Learmount 
2002).  
 
New institutional economists have recognized organizational trust for 
some time as an issue with implications for the way that companies 
are governed, and have attempted to extend and amend their theories 
to account for the phenomenon (Williamson 1993; Bromiley and 
Cummings 1995). The underlying assumptions of their approach to 
trust is that humans are self-interested and opportunistic; therefore the 
concern of transaction costs economics is to understand the 
constraints and sanctioning mechanisms that exist to enforce 
trustworthiness. In this view, it is generally assumed that trust is 
possible only in very small groups where there is repeated interaction, 
and is explained principally through calculation and hierarchical 
controls that proscribe individual self-interested behaviour (Varian 
1990; Stiglitz 1993). Emerging notions of trust in the organizational 
literature, by contrast, propose that the economist’s conceptualization 
is limited, and building on insights from other disciplines including 
psychology, sociology, political science and socio-biology aim to 
challenge the dominance of the ‘rational choice’ economic model of 




Powell (1996) attempts to distinguish between and draw-out the 
relevance for corporate governance of various different approaches to 
trust. He identifies and explores four varieties of trust, which he 
suggests operate as forms of governance in different ways depending 
on the type of co-operation being pursued. The first example he gives 
is of trust operating in geographically proximate companies, such as 
those in Silicon Valley or north-central Italy, where small-scale 
production units seem to operate on a different logic to integrated 
mass-production firms. In these networks he argues that the risks of 
the individual business units are attenuated through a trust which 
develops out of a co-operative infrastructure, depending not just on 
geographic proximity but close social networks. His second example 
concerns the importance of trust in rapidly developing technological 
fields where R&D networks engender a type of trust between 
individuals based on common membership of a professional 
community. This is a non-calculative type of trust where co-operation 
is ‘thickened’ through the sharing of ideas and knowledge. Thirdly he 
identifies the type of trust that builds up in close-knit business groups. 
As an example he discusses Japanese corporate networks, where he 
says the type of trust which is built-up is calculative and dependent on 
the maintenance of reputations. Finally he discusses the trust found in 
strategic alliances, which again he identifies as a form of calculative 
trust since the ‘terms’ of the type of trust are usually spelled out in a 
contract.  
 
The significance for corporate governance of the non-calculative form 
of trust that is engendered in close social networks is also elaborated 
in a notable article by Roberts (2001b), who discusses trust within UK 
boards of directors as a ‘socializing’ process of accountability, which 
is argued to complement the ‘individualizing’ processes of control. 
Within a board of directors, Roberts argues that trust is possible given 
‘the collective nature of the group’s formal responsibility, the face to 
face structure of meetings, and the relative balance of power between 
members’ (p.1563). Accountability through surveillance, monitoring 
and control in this context is conceived of not as an inferior or 
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deficient alternative, but as a solution to the problem of trust at a 
distance, where the processes associated with atomized individual 
interactions circumscribe the development of trust. In particular, 
Roberts claims that the ‘individualizing’ form of accountability that is 
produced by agency theory promotes a preoccupation with self rather 
than an awareness of reciprocal dependence. ‘Socializing’ forms of 
accountability by contrast allow the testing of assumptions through 
dialogue, which is a vital form of learning that can ‘produce complex 
relationships of respect, trust and felt reciprocal obligation’ (p.1567), 
which, he argues, are essential for the effective operation of 
companies. He is careful to argue that neither form of accountability 
is necessarily better than the other, but valuably delineates their 
associated (intended and unintended) effects.  
 
A related idea that I have proposed elsewhere (Learmount 2002) is 
that a ‘socially endogenous’ form of corporate governance operates in 
many Japanese firms, which entails an exacting system of close 
interpersonal scrutiny and sanctioning on the one hand, and processes 
that encourage and reward prosocial behaviour on the other. I argue 
that such a system appears to represent an effective means of directing 
and controlling certain companies, as the system not only inheres 
close social monitoring and sanctioning of exclusively self-serving 
behaviour, it also rewards behaviour that supports and enhances the 
collective goals and values of the whole social network of which the 
company is a part (which includes shareholders, creditors, suppliers, 
customers as well as employees).  
 
Such a system of corporate governance that operates through social 
controls does not constitute a straightforward alternative for a system 
based around hierarchical controls, as it is contingent on a particular 
socio-economic context. However, given this context, a system of 
corporate governance that draws on the voluntary reciprocal 
obligations and responsibilities enacted in everyday individual-level 
and organizational-level socio-economic interactions may be useful in 
considering the direction and control of companies where extant 
economics-derived approaches are largely silent. This context may 
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exist in family companies, other closely-held companies, start-up 
companies and public-sector companies. The notion of a ‘socially-
endogenous’ corporate governance may prove equally useful in 
understanding more fully the direction and control of large public 
companies, as mainstream economic approaches tend to assume away 
any meaningful internal governance processes (despite many 
corporate governance codes of practice implicitly recognizing their 
importance, for example emphasizing the need to balance the relative 
power of company chairman and chief executive (Cadbury 1992)). In 
addition, it may offer one way of exploring the link between a 
company’s system of governance and its production/innovation 
system, which mainstream economics-informed approaches fail to do 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan 1996; O’Sullivan 2000). Trust, for 
example, has not only been recognized as a coordination mechanism 
but has also been explored in terms of impact on production, and has 
even been proposed as a precondition for superior competitive 
performance (Sako 1998).  
 
Implications for Corporate Governance Research 
Work on the relevance of trust and social controls for corporate 
governance is still embryonic, and certainly requires further 
theoretical development and empirical scrutiny. Nonetheless, these 
new approaches do appear to represent a valuable complement to 
mainstream economics-derived approaches to corporate governance, 
especially as they recognize the firm not only as a production 
mechanism but also as a social organization, a political institution and 
a forum for innovation and knowledge-creation (Morgan 1986). 
Moreover, they represent a challenge to the hegemony of approaches 
to corporate governance that focus exclusively on the hierarchical 
control of the self-interested utility-maximising individual in a way 
that the other ‘organizational approaches’ do not. As discussed in this 
paper, most existing models of corporate governance tend to be built 
on the assumption that without external control, human beings are 
prone to act self-interestedly. What is perhaps not well understood by 
those who ascribe to this idea is that the ‘self-interested actor’ is 
possibly the product of these theories’ own self-fulfilling assumptions 
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(Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Roberts 2001a). The exploration of non-
hierarchical controls in systems of corporate governance takes into 
account the reality that human beings are at least equally capable of 
taking into consideration the interests of others alongside their own in 
making decisions and taking action, and are not solely motivated by 
incentives, monitoring and fiat. There is a substantial amount of 
empirical work which discredits the latter view of human motivation 
and behaviour (Asch 1951, 1956; Allison 1992; Mills and Clark 
1994), and yet the work of corporate governance researchers and 
policymakers, wittingly or unwittingly, continues to be strongly 
informed by it. 
 
Furthermore, acknowledgment of the relevance of social controls and 
trust urges a more complex (Roberts 2001b) conceptualization of ‘the 
corporate governance problem’: rather than a simplistic focus on the 
protection of investors’ (or owners’) capital, attention might be shifted 
towards a more generalized concern with the accountability of the 
corporation. This would, moreover, accord with one of the central 
arguments of Berle and Means (1932), which appears to have been 
largely ignored by many subsequent scholars. This is their suggestion 
that as a result of the widespread dispersion of shareholding, active 
ownership of the firm was being replaced by a far more passive form 
of ‘ownership’, and that consequently the traditional conception of the 
corporation as an entity truly ‘owned’ by shareholders had broken 
down. The effective disintegration of the private corporation signalled 
the arrival of the corporation as a social institution, warranting a new 
concern with the accountability of the corporation within society at 
large:  
 
Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against 
the paramount interests of the community. ...It remains only for the 
claims of the community to be put forward with clarity and force. 
Rigid enforcement of property rights as a temporary protection 
against plundering by control would not stand in the way of 
modification of these rights in the interest of other groups. When a 
convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is 
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generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today 
must yield before the larger interests of society. (Berle and Means 
1932: 312). 
 
It was only in a slightly later paper that Berle conceded that in lieu of 
a well-defined system of responsibilities to society, a system of 
accountability to shareholders was the most likely interim alternative: 
You cannot abandon emphasis on the view that business corporations 
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their shareholders until 
such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably 
enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else. (Berle 1932: 
1365). 
 
In conclusion, I do not want to discount the value of economic 
approaches to corporate governance, nor the relevance of their 
‘solutions’ for improving the way that companies are directed and 
controlled. The current dominance of the Anglo-American economic 
approach to corporate governance does, however, seem to risk 
prematurely curtailing broader, potentially valuable research on the 
governance of companies. I hope that by drawing attention to the 
various limitations of economic theories of the firm and discussing 
some of the organizational alternatives that have been proposed, this 
paper has called into question the hegemony of economic theories in 
theorizing the governance of the corporation. As descriptive theories, 
‘organizational approaches’ to corporate governance have many 
advantages over their economic counterparts, especially in that they 
tend to acknowledge the complexities of organizational life. Yet they 
also have their own drawbacks: stakeholder theories for example 
seem to share many of the limiting assumptions of the economic 
theories that they criticize, whilst notions of ‘trust-based’ or ‘socially 
endogenous’ corporate governance require a lot more theoretical 
development and empirical support. What these organizational 
alternatives do urge, however, is reflection on the currently pervasive, 
narrow definition of the ‘corporate governance problem’. In particular 
they commend a more extensive consideration of how companies are 
and might be governed, beyond current narrow concerns with the 
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